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Replication and emergence characterize many complex adaptive systems such as 
life or the immune system. In this paper I propose that the evolution of language 
structure over generations is best explained by a conjunction of replication and 
emergence processes at the level of linguistic utterances. 
REPLICATION happens when a token of a type is produced, and it is (a) 
similar, (b) caused by and (c) has received information from other tokens of the 
same type (Sperber, 1996). EMERGENCE is a property of complex adaptive 
systems (Gell-Mann, 1994), which are sets of elements that interact with their 
environment following simple rules. As the system unravels, its behaviour is not 
reducible to its elements and rules: its new properties are emergent or self-
organised. 
Transmission involves a flow of linguistic information towards new 
generations of speakers. In their first year of life, infants learn the sound 
categories of their ambient language, and this involves production and 
perception reinforcement loops (e.g. Vihman et al., 2009) and statistical 
category learning (e.g. Maye et al. 2002). With sound categories in place, actual 
phonetic realizations of sounds behave to all effects as REPLICATORS (Wedel, 
2006). Symbolic, referential function is not involved in this process, and the 
replicated information is purely formal. 
Towards the end of their first year, infants begin to produce their first stable 
sound combinations, which may be words, prosodic patterns etc. learned by 
imitation. Stable sound combinations also REPLICATE: the production of a token 
of sound combination is caused by and receives the information from similar 
tokens previously heard or produced. Imitation learning in humans, but not in 
other apes, tends to be more dependent on intention than on function: children 
seem to copy behaviours that they perceive as intentional (Tomasello, 2003) 
even if they do not have a function (Horner & Whiten, 2005).  
In contrast, morphosyntactic, semantic and pragmatic rules and categories 
cannot be replicated by imitation learning because they are not tokens in speech, 
but mental abstractions. I argue, contra the memetic position, but in agreement 
 with e.g. Sperber (1996), that mental entities do not replicate: a linguistic rule or 
category in a speaker’s head is not directly caused by tokens of the same rule or 
category in other speakers’ brains and there is certainly no need for information 
transfer (e.g. by teaching) towards new speakers. Instead, rules and categories 
EMERGE from interactions between the replicated information (sounds and sound 
combinations) and their environment, which is rather complex. It includes other 
sounds and sound combinations; the referents they become symbolically 
associated with, which have their own set of categories, dependencies and 
frequency distributions; and the speakers’ communicative needs and social 
interaction patterns.  
The perspective of cultural transmission as replication plus emergence has 
two important consequences. Firstly, the replication of forms independently of 
their functions  suggests that models of language evolution should not be based 
on units such as Saussurean signs or constructions, where form and function are 
inseparable. Secondly, this perspective focuses the study of the BIOLOGICAL 
evolution of language on cognitive mechanisms for the replication of sounds and 
stable sound combinations (such as vocal learning or form imitation) and for the 
emergence of complex utterances (such as symbolic association, inference, 
communication or categorization). 
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